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The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether domestic and foreign activities of Italian 
firms are mainly substitutes or complements. We take advantage of a unique firm-level panel 
data set from the Bank of Italy Survey of Industrial and Service Firms, which provides 
information on the international activity of a representative sample of Italian enterprises. We 
use matching methods to compare the performance of firms that become multinationals with 
that of firms that had considered the possibility to invest abroad, but had not yet done so. Using 
a different approach, we supplement the counterfactual strategy by studying the conditional 
over-time correlation between domestic and foreign employment of a sample of multinational 
firms. Both methods suggest that domestic and foreign activities are more likely to be 
complements than substitutes. The positive correlation between domestic and foreign 
employment is higher for the domestic highly-skilled workforce and for firms that have 
adopted complex strategies of internationalization. 
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1.  Introduction
1 
The increasing internationalization of production and its effect on the world economy is 
at  the  centre  of  economic  debate.  In  the  advanced  countries  the  main  concern  is  that,  by 
investing abroad, firms may relocate offshore some stages of production previously realized at 
home. If such activities are not replaced by other home production, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) will lead to an impoverishment of the domestic economy. Some politicians regard this as 
a threat and some are even prepared to introduce subsidies in order to stop firms delocalizing.
2 
The aim of this paper is to verify whether firms’ domestic and foreign activities are 
mainly substitutes or complements. We follow two different approaches. First, we assess  the 
effect  of  investing  abroad  on  a  sample  of  Italian  manufacturing  firms  that  have  started  to 
produce goods and services abroad (switching). Since switching firms and domestic firms are 
heterogeneous enterprises, contrasting the former with the latter can produce biased results 
because of the typical self selection issue. We tackle this problem by using an identification 
strategy based on key qualitative information provided by our data set. Namely, we know 
which  firms  had  considered  the  possibility  of  investing  abroad  but  had  not  yet  done  so. 
According to a large set of variables, these domestic “near investing” firms turn out to be 
similar  to  the  switching  ones.  To  reduce  further  the  heterogeneity  across  enterprises,  we 
compare switching enterprises with only the closest “near investing” firms in terms of several 
observables. We then use difference in difference (DID) estimates to control for time invariant 
differences in unobservables between the two groups. 
This  methodology  has  two  main  limitations.  First,  the  identification  strategy  relies 
crucially  on  the  assumption  that  switching  firms  and  their  control  group  differ  only  as  to 
switching, i.e. conditional on observables, internationalization is assumed to be random across 
the  two  groups.  This  is  a  strong  hypothesis,  which,  unfortunately,  is  not  directly  testable. 
Second, the identifying assumption is more likely to hold over a short time window. With a 
                                                 
1 The work for this paper was begun while I was visiting the Department of Economics at the UC Berkeley. I 
thank the Department for its hospitality. I would also like to thank Antonio Accetturo, Luigi Benfratello, Luigi 
Cannari, David Card, Alessio D’Ignazio, Stefano Federico, Massimo Gallo, Katariina Nilsson Hakkala, Enrico 
Moretti,  Giovanni  Peri,  Alfonso  Rosolia  and  two  anonymous  referees  for  their  precious  comments  and 
suggestions. I am also grateful to the participants at the Labor Lunch Seminar at UC Berkeley (March 2008), 
Norface Seminar II at the Cesifo Centre (Munich, October 2008), the Annual Meeting of the North American 
section of RSAI (New York, November 2008) and the Bank of Italy Territorial Analysis Seminar (December 
2008) for their comments. I am also indebted to Leandro D’Aurizio and Caterina Di Benedetto for their helpful 
advices in the use of the data set. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily 
correspond to those of the Bank of Italy. 
2  See e.g. the article “Not so exceptional. French industry is taking on more Anglo Saxon characteristics” in The 
Economist (28
th March 2008).   6 
long  time window  many  other  things  are  likely  to  happen  and  confound  the  effect  of 
internationalization. Thus, the method is less reliable over the medium to long term. 
Being aware of that, we supplement the analysis with a complementary econometric 
strategy.  Using  a  sample  of  multinational  enterprises  only,  we  explore  the  conditional 
correlation between domestic and foreign employment over a longer period. In order to take 
account of the intensity of internationalization, we also contrast multinationals that increased 
foreign employment with those that did not. 
The impact of the internationalization on domestic production may depend strongly on 
the motives for FDI. Therefore, in both models we consider the reasons for investment and we 
separate market seeking (horizontal) from factor seeking (vertical) FDI. In the second model  
we can also identify firms that pursue “complex” strategies of internationalization, which are a 
combination of the previous ones. 
Overall, our results suggest that domestic and foreign activities are more likely to be 
complements than substitutes. In the first model, the less favorable estimates show that sales 
and  productivity  decrease  two  years  after  the  investment  but  only  for  firms  that  have 
undertaken horizontal FDI. On the other hand, there are no significant effects on employment 
and on the skills composition of the workforce. With the second model, over a longer time 
span we found a positive relationship between domestic and foreign employment, in particular 
for  the  higher skilled  workforce  and  for  firms  that  adopted  complex  internationalization 
strategies. 
This paper is related to an established literature that studies the impact of international 
activity, especially exports, on firms’ performance; it includes, among others, Bernard and 
Jensen (1999), Wagner (2002), Girma et al. (2004), De Loecker (2007) (see for a review: 
Greenaway and Kneller, 2007). The literature that investigates the effects of FDI applying 
matching methodologies is scant. Barba Navaretti et al. (2010) analyze the impact of investing 
abroad for a sample of Italian and French firms using the propensity score matching method 
and DID estimates. They find a positive impact on productivity, output, and employment for 
investment  by  Italian  firms  in  developed  countries,  from  one  to  three  years  after  the 
investment, which is attenuated in the case of investment in developing countries. Hijizen et al. 
(2006)  carry  out  a  similar  analysis  on  French  firms.  They  observe  that  market seeking 
investment has a positive impact on employment and productivity, while for factor seeking 
investment the initial negative impact is compensated by a recovery two years after. In the case 
of  Germany,  Becker  and  Muendler  (2008)  show  how  in  the  multinational  enterprises  that 
expand abroad the employment, the domestic worker separation rate is significantly lower than   7 
in the matched non expanding multinationals. Further evidence on Italian firms is provided by 
Castellani et al. (2008), who estimate a dynamic panel data model. They find that the level of 
employment of parent companies does not change after the investment, but the composition of 
the workforce does: more specifically they observe a skill upgrading of the workforce for firms 
that invest in Central and Eastern European countries. As regards our second model, the related 
literature  includes  Blomström  et  al.  (1997),  Brainard  and  Riker  (1997a,b),  Braconier  and 
Ekholm  (2000)  and  Harrison  and  McMillan  (2007).  In  this  paper  we  follow  closely  the 
methodology of Blomström and co authors, who study the dynamics of domestic and foreign 
employment of a sample of US and Swedish multinational firms. 
This paper adds to the existing literature in three respects. First, our data set provides 
crucial  information  for  the  identification  strategy;  specifically,  we  know  which  firms  had 
considered the possibility of investing off shore but had not yet done so. In addition, a large set 
of quantitative variables, including exports and employment by skills, is also accessible. Such a 
wealth of information allows us to construct accurate control groups. Second, we address the 
issue with an additional econometric strategy. This supplementary model sheds light on the 
evolution of the domestic and foreign activity of a sample of multinationals over a longer 
period (6 years). Third, we attempt to verify whether the impact of internationalization changes 
according to different types of FDI, namely vertical, horizontal or complex. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  we  discuss  the  theoretical 
background. Sections 3 and 4 then focus on the first empirical strategy, and Section 5 on the 
second econometric model. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Background 
The  traditional  theory  of  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  distinguishes  between 
horizontal  and  vertical  FDI  (see  e.g.  Markusen,  2002).  Horizontal  FDI  occurs  when  firms 
produce similar goods or services in  multiple countries to overcome trade barriers, reduce 
transport costs or because they benefit from being close to the final customers. In vertical FDI 
firms fragment the production process into stages to take advantage of differences in input 
prices; thus, activities are located across countries according to the relative endowment of 
inputs.  It  is  argued  that  domestic  and  foreign  productions  are  substitutes  in  the  case  of 
horizontal  foreign  investment,  in  that  multinationals  produce  and  sell  directly  in  the  final 
markets, and complements in the case of vertical FDI, because the activities located in different 
countries  represent  stages  of  the  same  production  process  (Markusen  and  Maskus,  2001;   8 
Markusen, 2002). This theory can only partially help us to predict what happens in the case of 
firms that switch from domestic to multinational, i.e. those that invest abroad for the first time.  
Firstly,  the rigid separation between vertical and horizontal FDI is mainly theoretical. 
On the empirical level, it has been observed that the majority of FDI cannot be classified into 
just one of the two categories. In this regard, UNCTAD (1998) coined the term “complex 
integration strategies” to illustrate how firms find new forms of internationalization that are 
outside the vertical horizontal paradigm. Firms may break down the production process into 
different  stages  and  divide  these  stages  into  different  countries,  combining  market seeking 
(horizontal FDI) with factor seeking strategies (vertical FDI). They may also produce goods in 
cheap labor countries in order to benefit from the low input costs and sell the output in third 
markets, creating “export platforms”. Complex strategies are also documented by Feinberg and 
Keane (2006) who found that only 12 per cent of the US  multinationals with affiliates in 
Canada could be classified as purely horizontal and only 19 per cent as purely vertical. This 
empirical evidence has also motivated theoretical analyses. One of the first contributions is 
Yeaple (2003), who shows how firms in advanced countries can undertake complex strategies 
by investing in other advanced countries to reduce transport costs and in the less developed 
countries to take advantage of input price differentials. The equilibrium strategy depends on the 
combination of transport costs, fixed costs of investing abroad, and factor price differentials. 
As  a  result,  in  his  model,  foreign  and  domestic  production  can  be  either  complements  or 
substitutes. In a related model by Ekholm et al. (2007) export platform strategies can arise also 
in  equilibrium.  Grossman  et  al.  (2006)  develop  this  framework  by  introducing  firms’ 
heterogeneity in the presence of sunk costs. They assume that each type of internationalization, 
such as exporting or FDI, is associated with a different level of sunk costs; the highest ones are 
those relating to FDI. The authors show that the type of internationalization undertaken is 
correlated with firms’ productivity and that export platform strategies are mainly chosen by the 
more productive ones.  
Furthermore,  even  in  the  case  of pure  vertical  or  horizontal  strategies  the  effect  of 
internationalization  on  switching  firms  is  hardly  predictable.  For  example,  if  we  look  at 
domestic activity as measured by sales or employment, the expected effect of switching is 
ambiguous. Domestic production may decrease if firms move part of the production process 
previously produced at home, both in vertical and horizontal FDI. But it could also increase if 
firms are expanding their production abroad or if there are some complementarities between 
domestic and affiliates’ production lines; e.g. parent firms may supply certain types of services 
or inputs, such as management or marketing, to subsidiaries. A positive relationship can also   9 
occur when, thanks to the investment abroad, firms are more competitive and gain market 
shares. 
To  invest  abroad  might  also  have  structural  effects  on  the  home  workforce’s  skill 
intensity.  If  firms  displace  the  less  skill intensive  production  stages  we  will  see  a  skill 
upgrading of the workforce after the investment. This is not the only possible effect, though. 
Firms could also move the more skilled stages of production; for example some firms could 
locate R&D activities in the advanced countries where skilled workers are abundant, while 
others might transfer managers or supervisors abroad to guide subsidiaries. 
For productivity, the expectation on the impact is also ambiguous. We envisage that by 
relocating or acquiring some activities a firm should improve its productivity: firms may obtain 
efficiency gains by taking advantage of increasing returns to scale, rationalizing the division of 
labor across countries, or saving on input prices. However, the positive effect is likely to occur 
in the long term, while the short run impact can be negative if there are adjustment costs or 
frictions in the new firm’s international organization of labor. 
Summarizing, theory is unable to predict precisely the impact of investing abroad on 
the level of domestic activity. The outcome depends not only on the type of investment, but 
also on a number of other circumstances that are often case specific to each investment. 
3.  Empirical strategy and data 
Our first goal is to evaluate the causal effect of investing abroad (switch) on the firm’s 
domestic activities. For this purpose, ideally we want to observe the same firm in two different 
settings, one where it becomes multinational and another where it remains domestic. Formally, 
let yit be our outcome variable of firm i at time t, and SWITCHit={1,0} an indicator if the firm i 
switches  from  domestic  to  multinational  at  time  t.  The  causal  effect  of  switching  on  the 






it+s is the value of the variable y of the 
switching firm i after the investment and y
0
it+s the value of the same variable in the same period 
if the firm i had not switched. The problem is that y
0
it+s is unobservable for the firms that have 
switched. To overcome this issue we follow the traditional approach of the program evaluation 
literature (e.g. see Angrist and Kruger, 1999; Heckman et al., 1997). We define the average 










it+s|SWITCHit=1}      (1) 
   10 
and since y
0
it+s is unobservable, we try to construct a valid counterfactual for the last 
term of the equation (1) by choosing a control group of firms that had not switched. Finally, the 
impact is estimated by substituting the last term of equation (1) with E{y
0
it+s|SWITCHit=0}, the 
average of the outcome variable for a sample of firms that did not switch. 
The  challenge  of  this  strategy  is  the  construction  of  a  valid  control  group.  Ideally, 
controls should differ from switching firms only for not having switched. In our case the task is 
particularly  challenging  because  the  choice  of  investing  abroad  is  endogenous  and  self 
selection bias is likely to occur. For example, it is known that multinationals are larger, more 
productive, and with higher export propensity and R&D outlays than domestic firms (see e.g. 
Markusen, 1995; Helpman et al., 2004). Hence, merely comparing the performance of the two 
groups could lead to biased results because of the self selection and endogeneity issues. 
We attempt to remove the self selection bias in several ways. First, we rely on the 
strategic information provided by our data set. More specifically, we can identify the firms that 
had  considered  the  possibility  of  investing  abroad  but  had  not  yet  done  so.  These  “near 
investing” firms are more likely to mimic the behavior of switching firms. The closeness of the 
two  groups,  documented  later,  encourages  our  identification  scheme.  Second,  we  match 
switching and near investing firms that belong to the same 2 digit sector and that are as similar 
as possible to each other according to several observables, in levels and trends, before the 
investment.
3 Then, we run difference in differences estimates. With DID the impact of the 
investment abroad is estimated by the change in the difference between switching and control 









where t* is the year of the first foreign investment. The advantage of the DID estimates is that 
they allow for time invariant differences in observables and also in non observables between 
switching  and  domestic  firms  (Blundell  and  Costa Dias,  2000;  Smith  and  Todd,  2005a). 
Finally, we collect evidence from different control groups and econometric models for the 
purpose of robustness checks. 
The econometric model for the DID estimates is the following: 
                                                 
3 We use one on one matching method. In order to choose the domestic firms belonging to control groups we rely 
on a variant of the Mahalanobis metric (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) given by the following distance function 
=│∑k∑j ωk(Xki  Xkj) │; where i=switching firms, j=domestic firms (of the same 2 digit sector); X=is the set of the 
main  observables  in  logarithm  (employment,  sales,  exports)  together  with  the  annual  change  in  sales  and 
employment; ωk= weight assigned to observable k. We did not adopt the more popular propensity score method of 
matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) because the limited sample size hampered the estimation of the p score 
by sector. We tried to estimate the propensity score over the whole sample and then matching switching with 
domestic firms with the nearest value of p score within the same industry. However, since firms were paired 
within the same sector after the estimate of the p score, the balancing properties after the matching were not 
satisfying.   11 
 
yit= αt + αr + αp + β1(Postiτ) + β2(SWITCHi) + γ(Postiτ*SWITCHi) +  eit                             (2)
   
where, αt, αr, αp are full sets of fixed effects at the level of year, region of localization of the 
firms, pairs of firms (each treated and its control), respectively; SWITCHi=1 for switching 
firms and 0 for the controls; let ti* be the switching year of firm i and τi a time indicator equal 
to 0 in the year of the investment abroad, we then define Post=1 if either τi=ti*+1 or τi=ti*+2 
and Post=0 if τi=ti* 1; eit is the error term with the usual characteristics. Our outcome variable 
y  is  the  log  of  employment,  sales,  skill intensity  and  labor  productivity  –all  referring  to 
domestic activity. γ is the parameter of interest: it measures the change in the difference of the 
outcome variable between switching and controls after the investment; it is our estimate of the 
effect of switching on domestic activity. 
The DID estimator is implicitly based on the common trend assumption: the validity of 
the inference is undermined if the two groups show different trends in the outcome variables 
before the treatment (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; Blundell et al., 2004). Therefore, we 
carefully  check  that  in  the  pre investment  period  the  growth  rates  of  the  main  outcome 
variables did not differ substantially between the two groups. 
Another implicit assumption of this methodology is that investing abroad must not have 
an impact on the activity of domestic firms. If the control group is indirectly affected by the 
investment abroad – e.g. because, thanks to efficiency gains, switching firms subtract market 
shares from competing domestic ones –  the evaluation will be biased. Unfortunately, there is 
not a formal way to test this hypothesis. We can only assume that it holds in the short term. 
This should not appear too restrictive if we believe that off shore investment actually can have 
an impact on domestic market, but that the effects occur only gradually over time. Therefore, it 
is likely that the bias arises only over the medium long term. 
 
3.1  Data 
Data are drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey of Industrial and Service Firms, which 
has been conducted annually since the early ’80s on a representative sample of Italian firms. 
The  survey  collects  several  quantitative  information,  including  firms’  sales,  exports, 
investment, number of employees (of which, blue collar workers), profits, start year, research 
and  development  expenditure,  and  wages.  In  this  paper  only  manufacturing  firms  are   12 
considered.  Data  are  collected  directly  by  regional  branches  of  the  Bank  of  Italy;  their 
involvement assures a high  participation rate (78 per cent) and good data quality. For more 
information on the survey, including the questionnaire, see Bank of Italy (2006).  
In 2004 the Bank of Italy asked the firms with at least 50 employees information on 
their international activity. We use the 2004 year of the survey, in combination with the other 
waves from 1984 to 2006, to collect data on firms that started to produce goods or services 
abroad during this period (switching firms), on firms that had considered the possibility of 
investing abroad but had not yet done so (near investing firms) and on the other firms that did 
not produce abroad (other domestic firms). From the last two groups we select the control 
groups for switching firms. 
The samples of switching and control groups are balanced over a period of four years, 
starting two years before the investment and ending one year after. We also present the results 
of the model estimated up to two years after the investment on the sub sample of firms for 
which data are available. We are aware that longer time spans would have provided a wider 
and probably a more interesting picture. However, there are two main obstacles to stretching  
the period: sample size would have been reduced, because firms are not always present in the 
survey  and,  more  importantly,  the  reliability  of  our  evaluation  exercise  would  have  been 
considerably weakened because the identifying assumptions are less likely to hold for a longer 
time period when many other things can occur to confound the effect of switching.
4 
In Table 1 we describe our samples. In the 2004 survey there are 1,668 manufacturing 
firms with at least 50 employees.
5 Of these 270 are multinationals (they currently produce 
                                                 
4  We illustrate our strategy to construct the group of switching firms and its controls as follows. 1) We asked the 
firms if they produce goods or services abroad or if they had considered the possibility of carrying out part of the 
productive activity abroad in 2003 04: we denoted as domestic firms those with negative answers. 2) We asked the 
firms giving positive answers whether they currently produced goods or services abroad and when they started 
their foreign activity: we called the firms with positive answers multinationals, and those with negative answers 
“near investing” domestic firms, because they had considered the possibility of investing but had not yet done so.  
3) Finally, we denote as switching firms the multinationals that started to produce abroad in the interval 1984 
2004 and that were observed continuously from two years before to one year after the foreign investment.  
In the  paper we match switching firms with control groups of firms drawn from domestic and near investing firm 
samples. Notice that the control groups might also include firms that did not produced offshore in 2004 but that 
had produced abroad sometime in the past. Even if we cannot exclude the possibility that these firms are included 
in the control groups, we can estimate the probability that in our sample MNEs completely stopped producing 
abroad. Using the 2006 wave of the survey we find that out of 154 firms that had offshore activity in 2000, only 8 
have no more foreign employment in 2006 (5.2 per cent; the interval 2000 06 is the time span for which data are 
available). By applying this percentage to our samples we can conclude that about 3 4 firms of our control group 
might be affected by this bias. (Of course, the percentage might increase for a longer time period, however, in our 
sample more than 70% of the firms switched in a time windows of 7 years). Thus, according to this evaluation and 
taking into account that we use more than one control group, we believe that the event of opposite switchers (from 
multinationals to completely domestic) has a low probability and can have only a marginal impact on our results. 
5 Notice that the 5 largest firms (more than 8,000 employees) have been excluded because of the difficulty of 
finding an appropriate matching.   13 
goods or services abroad), about 16 per cent, of which the sub sample of switching firms totals 
89. Among the remaining firms that did not invest abroad, 280 are near investing and 1,118 are 
the other domestic firms. The table confirms the well known characteristics of multinationals: 
they are larger, with higher export propensity, more productive, older, pay a higher wage, 
employ more skilled workers and invest more in R&D activity than domestic firms. According 
to our samples, investment employee ratio and profits are instead smaller. Switching firms do 
not  on  average  differ  noticeably  from  multinationals,  although  it  is  worth  mentioning  the 
higher wages and human capital, together with lower productivity, in the former with respect to 
the latter. 
Among  the  domestic  firms,  the  “near investing”  ones  are  evidently  closer  to  the 
switching firms than to the other domestic firms. The similarity is stronger with switching 
firms that become multinationals in the period 2003 04, the same period in which the “near 
investing” enterprises have thought of investing abroad (see columns 5 and 6 of Table 1). The 
Table also reports the standard errors for the sample means. For switching firms, investment 
and exports record the largest values among the main variables: about 22 and 20 per cent of the 
mean, respectively. For this reason we preferred not to consider such variables as outcomes. 
Table  2  illustrates  the  distribution  of  switching  firms  by  year  of  the  first  foreign 
investment, sector and region of localization. In our sample the majority of the firms switched 
between 1998 and 2004 (about 70 per cent).
6 The sectors  most often represented are those in 
which Italian industry specializes: machinery and equipment (with electrical machinery) and 
some traditional sectors (such as leather products, other manufacturing industries and textiles 
and clothing). As regards the region of localization, as expected, the number of switching firms 
is larger in the North (in particular in Piedmont, Lombardy, Emilia Romagna, Friuli Venezia 
Giulia and Veneto) than in the Centre and South (with some exceptions, such as Le Marche 
and Puglia). 
4.  Results 
We  start  by  matching  switching  firms  with  the  sample  of  “other  domestic  firms” 
(Matching #1). We use the method of matching on covariates described before to construct the 
control group for the switching firms. Since the matching is carried out by sector and over the 
                                                 
6 This concentration of switching firms over time is due to the fact that information on FDI was gathered in 2004 
and there is some attrition in the data.   14 
same time span, for a few firms it was impossible to find an appropriate match, these firms are 
dropped from the analysis.
7 
The means of several observables and their time changes for the two groups just before 
switching are reported in the Appendix (Table A1). In order to measure the similarity between 
the two groups, we report the differences in means and the standardized difference (SDIFF) of 
several variables between the two groups.
8 Given that there is no formal criterion for defining a 
critical value of SDIFF, we follow the standard practice of considering large a value of 20 per 
cent (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Smith and Todd, 2005b).  
Overall the two samples are rather similar. Differences in means are not statistically 
significant and for all the observables in levels SDIFF are below 10 per cent, except in the case 
of investment and profits. Differences in growth rates are larger but still within reasonable 
boundaries for all the variables. 
In Matching #2 we compare the switching firms with a control group of matched firms 
drawn from those that had thought of investing abroad but had not yet done so (near investing). 
The  balancing  properties  are  shown  in  Table  A2  in  the  Appendix.  The  means  of  the  two 
samples  are  very  close,  especially  for  variables  in  levels,  and  the  differences  are  never 
statistically significant. SDIFF are much smaller than the worrying threshold of 20 per cent. By 
comparing the balancing properties of the two matching samples, we notice that the control 
group drawn from the near investing firms (matching #2) turns out to be closer to switching 
firms than to the control group drawn from the other domestic firms (matching #1). In the 
former the mean of the standardized differences, in absolute value, is 6 per cent lower than the 
same mean calculated over the latter; 13 per cent lower if we do not include in the computation 
the difference in the firms’ start year, which is presumably only marginally correlated with 
firm performance. The greater ability to mimic the observables of switching firms confirms our 
a priori that near investing firms are a more appropriate set from which to draw an accurate 
control group for switching enterprises. We regard this group as our preferred match, although 
for illustrative purposes we present results for both. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the unconditional means of the outcome variables for switching 
firms and their controls, from 2 years before internationalization to 2 years after. Notice that 
                                                 
7 From 89 switching firms, we end up with 85 firms in matching # 1 and 82 in matching # 2. Notice that the 82 
switching firms belonging to the second control group are different from the 85 switching firms in the first control 
group. 
8 The SDIFF of the variable y is given by the difference in means between switching and matched controls divided 
by the square root of the average variances of the variable y in the two groups. Formally: 
SDIFF(y)=100(1/N)[Σi(yi)  Σj(yj)]/[Var(yi)+Var(yj)/2]
1/2, where i denotes switching firms and j firms in the control 
group.    15 
because of the availability of data at t*+2 the sample of matching #1 is reduced by 10 pairs of 
firms and that of matching #2 by 14 pairs. Apparently, from the pictures it seems that there is 
no significant impact of FDI over the short period. DID estimates of parameter γ for different 
models are reported in Table 3. The model is estimated with and without region, time and pairs 
dummies. The pre switching time period taken as reference for the DID estimates is one year 
before the first investment abroad (t* 1). We will discuss mainly the results of the second 
(preferred) matching.
9 
The result of the estimates confirm the first impression. One year after the investment, 
the changes in the employment, sales, skill intensity and productivity of switching firms are 
very close to those of the control group, both in economic and statistical terms. After two 
years, the differences in absolute value increase slightly, although they remain quite low and 
statistically  non significant  (to  1.0  per  cent  for  employment,   5.9  for  sales,   0.7  for  skill 
intensity and  6.9 for productivity). Notice that the model estimated including fixed effects 
produces almost identical results and that if the model is estimated with the lagged dependent 
variable (at t* 2) as regressor the results are unchanged (they are not shown but are available 
upon request). This almost imperceptible difference confirms the validity of our control group.  
A somewhat different picture emerges from the estimates based on matching #1: in this 
case the results are more positive for switching firms. This difference suggest that the selection 
bias might not have been removed completely from this control group. 
The overall dynamic could mask substantial heterogeneity effects across firms. It is 
possible, in fact, that the effect differs along with the type of investment and that without 
differentiation the outcomes may be blurred. In particular, firms might experience different 
dynamics with different motives for internationalization. For example, for firms that carry out 
vertical  investment  to  reduce  labor  costs,  domestic  activity  might  be  stimulated  by  the 
investment,  since  in  this  case  home  production  can  complement  production  performed 
offshore. In the case of horizontal investment the opposite may occur, since a share of the 
production process initially carried out at home is delocalized. Distinguishing vertical from 
horizontal FDI in the data is a hard task, however. In the literature some authors differentiate 
vertical from horizontal FDI according to the country of destination of the investment (e.g. 
Barba Navaretti et al., 2010), others to the sector of the internationalizing firm. Neither method 
is problem free. For example, developing countries can attract both horizontal and vertical 
investment as they offer cheap workforce and also represent expanding markets, e.g. China and 
                                                 
9 In the estimates we do not use sample weights.   16 
India. A similar criticism applies to the approach based on sector, distinguishing traditional 
industries from the others. A more promising method, which unfortunately we are not able to 
follow owing to data constraints, is that of Harrison and McMillan (2007), who use the amount 
of trade flows between parents and foreign subsidiaries. In the light of these considerations we 
adopt  a  different  approach.  We  distinguish  the  type  of  firms’  investment  according  to  the 
change in the vertical integration of the productive process after the investment. We define as 
vertical firms that record a fall of more than 5 per cent in the value added/sales ratio after the 
investment  and  as  horizontal  the  others  (different  thresholds  change  the  results  only 
marginally). A non marginal drop in the ratio suggests that the firms have delocalized abroad 
part of the productive process previously carried out internally. We are aware that this method 
is  also  questionable.  For  example,  we  may  include  among  vertical  FDI  firms  that  have 
undertaken outsourcing strategy in the home country at the same time as investing abroad. 
Moreover, complex strategies might be at play in both types of investment, although we tend to 
think that they fall in the vertical category if the delocalization of the productive process is 
sufficiently large. Even with these caveats in mind, we believe the exercise sheds further light 
on the effects of internationalization. Since data on value added of switching firms are not 
available in the Bank of Italy’ survey; we have collected them from the balance sheet data set 
provided by the Company Accounts Data Service   CERVED.
10  
The DID estimates by type of investment are obtained by interacting the dummy for 
switching with two dummies for each type of FDI (vertical and horizontal) and running the 
following regression:  
 
yit=  αt  +  αr  +  αp  +  δ1(Postiτ)  +  δ2(SWITCHi*Verticali)  +  δ3(SWITCHi*Horizontali) 
γ1(Postiτ*SWITCHi*Verticali) + γ2(Postiτ*SWITCHi*Horizontali) +   ηit                                        (3) 
  
the results for the parameters of interest, γ1 and γ2, are reported in Table 4.
 11 
In line with the theoretical indications, in our preferred matching the results show that 
in vertical FDI (potentially including complex FDI) domestic and foreign activity are more 
complementary than in the horizontal FDI. More in detail, as regards vertical FDI, the impact 
of investment abroad on employment, sales, skill intensity and productivity turns out to be 
statistically non significant and very close to zero: after two years the DID coefficients are, 
respectively, 3.7, 1.1,  0.8 and  2.6 per cent in the model without fixed effects (close values 
                                                 
10 The Company Account Data Service   CERVED provides balance sheet data for almost all Italian corporations. 
11 In matching #1 (matching #2) there are 39 (37) vertical and 46 (45) horizontal firms.    17 
emerge from the model with fixed effect). On the other hands, for horizontal FDI the scenario 
is rather different. The investment seems to induce a negative effect on domestic activity: for 
example, two years after the investment employment, sales and productivity are 0.9, 11.2 and 
10.2 per cent lower than in the control group, and the last two coefficients are also statistically 
significant.  However,  as  regards  skill  intensity,  we  observe  no  significant  changes  in  its 
composition. The drop in productivity might be explained by the initial increase in direct and 
indirect costs  to  coordinate the  foreign  activity  of  subsidiaries.  Again,  with  the  alternative 
matching the results are more optimistic: the coefficients are (almost) ever positive and in the 
vertical FDI they are also statistically significant for employment and sales. 
 
4.1  Robustness checks 
One  potential  weakness  of  our  analysis  derives  from  the  survivorship  bias.  If  the 
probability  to  survive  for  switching  firms  decreases  after  internationalization,  e.g.  because 
investing abroad is risky and a share of switching firms dies as a consequence of unsuccessful 
investment, DID estimates are upward biased (of course, bias arises only if the probability of 
failing for switching firms is larger than the probability of failing if the firm remains domestic). 
Another  source  of  bias  comes  from  the  possibility  that  firms  move  the  whole  production 
process to another country and are no longer observables in our data set. 
We address the attrition issue in the following way. We assume that the survivorship 
rate does not substantially change immediately after the investment but only over a longer 
time span. We consider this a reasonable assumption. If a firm makes the wrong investment it 
should still have the resources to survive for some years after switching. This is even more 
likely for our sample, which includes large switching firms. Similarly, in the event that firms 
move the whole production process away, it is reasonable to assume  that the cessation of 
domestic activity will occur after some years after the first investment. This because the first 
off shore investment is riskier and enterprises will probably decide to close home activities 
only after it has proved successful. 
In the light of these considerations, we tackle attrition by restricting the analysis to 
firms that switched in a period close to 2004, the year of the survey. In particular, we focus on 
those that invested from 1999 onwards. The timing of the restriction is arbitrary; however, 
changing the starting year has no significant impact on the results.    18 
The comparison of the switching and the control group is shown in Table A3 in the 
appendix. The balancing properties do not seem very satisfactory in the first matching, while 
they are substantially better in the second. The DID estimate results are reported in panel A of 
Table  A4.  We  notice  that  for  all  the  outcome  variables  the  results  tend  to  confirm  those 
obtained with the previous exercises. The sign of the parameters is almost always confirmed 
and again for all the variables the DID coefficients are not statistically significant. From these 
findings it seems that attrition can bias our results only marginally. 
A  second  concern  relates  to  the  possibility  that  our  findings  depend  crucially  on 
outliers.  Therefore,  as  robustness  check  we  exclude  the  1
st  and  the  99
th  percentile  of  the 
distribution of the time change of each outcome variable. Results are reported in panel B of 
Table A4. The exercise is reported for the period t*+2 for the sake of synthesis, but similar 
results are obtained at t*+1 (they are not shown but are available upon request). Also this 
exercise substantially confirms the previous findings. 
  
5.  Further evidence from a different empirical strategy  
In this section we present further evidence from a complementary econometric strategy. 
For a sample of multinational manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees, we estimate the 
conditional correlation between domestic and foreign employment (employees in the foreign 
subsidiaries) over the period 2000 06. This exercise has several advantages. First, unlike the 
previous model only firms that have produced goods or services abroad during this period are 
examined (i.e. only MNEs); therefore, firms’ heterogeneity is attenuated. Second, we are able 
to study the dynamics of domestic and foreign activity over a longer time span (6 years). Third, 
the answers of the firms allow a more precise classification of FDI, given that we are also able 
to classify complex FDI. 
There is an established literature studying the degree of substitution between domestic 
and foreign activity at firm level. As regards employment, Blomström et al. (1997) regress the 
employment of US and Swedish parent firms on sales of foreign affiliates, controlling for the 
level  of  domestic  output.  They  conclude  that  foreign  sales  are  negatively  correlated  with 
domestic employment for US firms, while the opposite occurs for Swedish multinationals. A 
different group of studies has estimated labor demand equations testing cross country wage 
elasticity  to  assess  the  degree  of  substitution  of  labor  employed  abroad  and  at  home.  For 
example,  Brainard  and  Riker  (1997a,b)  focus  on  US  multinationals  and  find  that  labor  is   19 
complementary  if  affiliates  are  located  in  similar  countries  for  factor  endowments,  and 
substitutive if subsidiaries are in different countries. Braconier and Ekholm (2000) follow a 
similar approach focusing on Swedish multinationals. They find evidence of substitution when 
affiliates are located in high income countries, but no evidence of substitution when affiliates 
are  in  low income  countries.  Harrison  and  McMillan  (2007)  study  further  the  impact  of 
changes  in  foreign  affiliate  wages  on  US  firms’  employment,  distinguishing  between 
horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. Their paper shows that in horizontal FDI domestic and foreign 
employment tend to be substitutive, and the opposite occurs in vertical FDI. 
Because  we  do  not  know  firms’  wages  in the  off shore activities  we  are  unable  to 
estimate cross country wage elasticities and therefore we follow an approach closer to that of 
Blomström et al. (1997). 
In the 2006 survey, 210 firms reported having produced outputs abroad in the period 
2000 06; 101 of these  were interviewed in 2000. This sub sample of firms is the object of our 
analysis.
12 We explore the dynamics of domestic employment assuming it to be a function of 
the level of domestic and foreign activity:  
 
log(E)it=  αi  +  αt  +  β1  log(Domestic  Sales)it  +  β2  log(Domestic  Sales)
2
it  +  β3  log(Foreign 
Employment)it + ΣsδsTrends + ΣrδrTrendr + εit                 (4) 
 
where Eit is the domestic employment of firm i at time t. We include a full set of firm specific 
and year fixed effects to control for firms’ heterogeneity and common time shocks. We also 
include sectoral and regional specific trends to allow for the dynamics of labor markets that 
influence labor demand by sector, such as changes in industrial relationships or sector specific 
business fluctuations, and differences in regional economic growth. As a proxy for domestic 
activity we use sales and sales squared to take account of possible non linearity; for the level of 
foreign activity we use employment in foreign affiliates.
 13 
In order to control for individual fixed effects we take time differences from 2000 and 
2006 of model (4) and estimate the following equation: 
 
 log(E)it = α + β1  log(Domestic Activity)it + β2  log (Domestic Activity)
2
it + β3 log(Foreign 
Activity)it + δs + δr + ηit                     (5) 
                                                 
12 Notice only a very small number of these firms are included in the sample of the previous exercise.  
13 Sales are at current prices. For homogeneity we do not deflate domestic sales because we are not able to deflate 
foreign sales. However, using domestic sales at constant prices changes the results only marginally.    20 
 
where  y= y2006 y2000. 
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 5; β3 is our coefficient of interest 
which estimates the conditional correlation between home and foreign employment. The fit of 
the model is rather good. One third of the variance of domestic employment is explained by the 
model without fixed effects and almost half with regional and sectoral fixed effects. We notice 
that with OLS estimates the coefficient of foreign employment is always positive. According to 
the estimation a 1 per cent increase in foreign employment is correlated with an increase of 
about 0.02 per cent in total domestic employment. This coefficient is relatively stable across 
the  model  specifications  but  turns  out  to  be  non statistically  significant  at  the  standard 
confidence intervals. 
Our model is not based on a specific theory; rather it investigates the partial correlation 
between  domestic  and  foreign  employment.  It  is  also  possible  that  changes  in  domestic 
employment induce changes in foreign employment. In that case foreign employment could be 
correlated with the error term and the estimation of the correspondent coefficient could be 
biased. We deal with the potential endogeneity problem through instrumental (IV) method and 
2SLS estimates. We use the level of foreign employment in year 2000 as instrument for the 
changes in foreign employment. In column 4 we report the results of the IV estimation. The 
result  of  the  F test  in  the  first  stage  is  rather  high  (F=35.8).  The  coefficient  of  foreign 
employment is still positive but larger than the previous estimates (0.038). However, it remains 
statistically non significant at the standard level.  
In columns 5  12 we show the estimates using the changes in either white or blue collar 
domestic employment as dependent variable. White collars are managers or employees and 
blue  collars  are  workers.  According  to  our results, the  conditional  correlation between  the 
changes in domestic and foreign activity is considerably larger for white collars than for blue 
collars. In the complete model, the coefficient for white collars is about three times that for 
blue collars: 3.6 per cent (6.0 per cent if estimated by IV) and 1.1 per cent (2.2 per cent if 
estimated by IV), respectively. Only for white collars the parameters turns out to be statistically 
significant. These results do not depend on outliers. The results shown in the last three columns 
of Table 5, where we have excluded the 1
st and 99
th percentile of the distributions of the 
dependent variables, are almost identical. 
We  provide  additional  evidence  that  domestic  and  foreign  employment  are  mostly  
complements  and  that  the  employment  of  high skilled  workforce  is  correlated  more  than 
average  with  off shore  employment.  It  is  interesting  now  to  estimate  the  correlations  by   21 
different types of FDI. Compared with the previous model, the method of classifying firms 
according to the different kinds of FDI is more accurate here, as we have collected information 
on the main reason for the investment abroad directly from the firms. Thus, we are able to 
classify firms that have invested off shore for the following non mutually exclusive reasons: 
lower labor costs, proximity to final markets, other motivations (e.g. tax incentives, regulation, 
etc). Firms that assessed either labor costs or proximity to final markets as being important or 
very important are classified as pure vertical or horizontal, respectively. Firms that considered 
both these reasons important (or very important) are classified as complex and the remaining 
firms as other.
14 Table 6 gives the results of the model (5) estimated by interacting foreign 
employment with four dummies, one for each type of FDI. Overall, all the coefficients are 
positive. The correlation turns out to be larger in the case of complex investment and other 
types of investment than for pure vertical or horizontal FDI; the coefficients are not statistically 
significant, though. The results tend to confirm those obtained in the previous models (equation 
3), where we found that the effect of switching was more positive for vertical complex FDI. By 
distinguishing the impact on domestic white and blue collar employment the results become 
more clear cut. The correlation between domestic white collars and foreign employment in the 
case  of  complex  FDI  is  equal  to  6.8  per  cent  and  statistically  significant  (robust  standard 
error=0.034);  on  the  other  hand,  blue collar  employment  turns  out  to  be  only  marginally 
correlated with foreign employment (the largest coefficient estimated is equal to 1.7 per cent). 
The counterfactual analysis carried out in the previous section might be plagued if we 
were unable to control successfully for the heterogeneity between multinationals and domestic 
firms. In this regard, information on the level of foreign and domestic activity gathered in 2006 
turns out to be important for indirectly checking for the robustness of our previous results. We 
proceed as follows. By using the 2006 release of the survey we focus only on multinational 
firms (MNEs), those with positive foreign employment in 2006. We then estimate the effect of 
foreign expansion, rather than of switching as in previous counterfactual model, by comparing 
the expanding MNEs with non expanding MNEs. We use two methods to identify expanding 
MNEs.  First,  expanding  firms  are  those  that  experienced  a  growth  in  foreign  employment 
between 2000 and 2006; second, expanding firms are those that show larger changes in foreign 
employment than the median. The aim is to compare the performance of firms that are more 
                                                 
14 The other possible answers were: unimportant; of little importance; not applicable. The firms’ distribution by 
FDI category is the following: 24 per cent made vertical FDI, 38 per cent horizontal, 26 per cent complex and 13 
per cent others.   22 
homogenous (all are MNEs) before and after the increase in foreign exposure.
15 From the 101 
MNEs we collect 74 expanding firms (51 with the second threshold) and 24 non expanding 
firms (47 with the second threshold). The three largest firms, with more than 8000 employees, 
are  excluded  to  reduce  differences between  the  groups.  The  mean  differences  of  domestic 
employment, sales and exports between the two groups are not statistically significant (first 
three  columns  of  Table  7).  The  last  two  columns  of  Table  7  contain  the  estimates  of  the 
coefficient g of the following model:  
 
log(E)it = a1 + b1(Post)t + b2(Expand)i + g(Expand*Post)it + δs + δr + fit                 (6) 
 
where t=2000, 2006; Post=1 in 2006 and 0 in 2000; Expand is a dummy variable denoting 
expanding  firms;  δs  and  δr  are  sectoral  and  regional  fixed  effects.  DID  estimates  tend  to 
confirm those previously obtained: The coefficient g turns out to be positive and statistically 
significant; it is smaller when we use the median as threshold. These findings are consistent 
with those obtained by Becker and Muendler (2008) for German firms. 
 
5.1  Extension: Results by domestic geographical area 
We  extended  the  analysis  further  to  verify  whether  there  are  heterogeneous  results 
across firms localized in different areas of the country. This exercise is motivated by the fact 
that in Italy local economic differences run deep; advanced areas (especially the North West) 
contain the majority of internationalized firms, while the number of multinationals is very 
small  in  the  South.  However,  in  recent  years  Italian  firms  have  been  internationalizing 
production at a very rapid pace, especially firms localized in the regions of the North East 
(NE),  a  highly  industrialized  area  with  a  large  number  of  small  and  medium  enterprises. 
According  to  the  Reprint Polytechnic  of  Milan  database,  the  number  of  the  foreign  firms 
participated by Italian firms localized in the north eastern regions has increased by over 550 
units between 2001 and 2006. 
The  exercise  is  carried  out  on  both  the  models.  In  the  counterfactual  analysis  we 
estimate equation (2) where the dummy (Switch*Post) is interacted with two other dummies: 
one that identifies the firms localized in the North East and another those in the Centre and 
                                                 
15 Becker and Muendler (2008) follow a similar approach. Notice that in our sample switching firms form a sub 
sample of expanding firms. Results shown later are substantially unchanged if we exclude switching firms from 
the analysis.   23 
South. Therefore, we estimate two additional parameters that measure the differential impact of 
internationalization for north eastern and central and southern firms with respect to those in the 
North West. The results are reported in Table A5 of the appendix. For the North East the 
impact seems rather similar to the North West: the parameters are almost never significantly 
different between the two areas. Some differences arise for the firms in the Centre and South: 
the impact of employment is sometimes significantly larger, while the skill composition is 
smaller. For the other outcome variables we do not observe any significant differential effects.  
We  analyze  the  differential  impact  by  area  also  through  the  second  model:  we 
interacted the geographical areas dummies with the foreign employment variable in equation 
(5). The results are shown in Table A6. In this case we find that firms in the North East have 
significantly lower correlations between domestic and foreign employment than those in the 
North West,  especially  for  white collar  employment,  while  there  are  no  differences  with 
central and southern firms. We argue that the results for north eastern firms are due to the fact 
that these enterprises have to a greater extent undertaken strategies that are less favorable to 
domestic  activity:  the  majority  have  chosen  horizontal  (or  pure  vertical)  FDI  instead  of 
complex  FDI.  However,  given  the  limited  sample  size,  the  results  have  to  be  taken  with 
extreme caution and considered mainly indicative. 
6.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  study  the  relationship  between  domestic  and  foreign  activities  on 
different  samples  of  Italian  manufacturing  firms  using  two  complementary  econometric 
models.  Compared  with  the  previous  literature,  our  analysis  benefits  from  a  richer  set  of 
qualitative and quantitative information. 
Both methodologies suggest that overall domestic and foreign activities are more likely  
to be complements than substitutes. In the first model, the less favorable estimates show that 
two  years  after  the  investment,  sales  and  productivity  decrease,  but  only  for  firms  that 
undertake horizontal FDI. This drop does not happen in vertical complex FDI. As regards the 
employment and skill composition of workforce, there are no significant effects. If anything, 
the impact turns out to be more positive than negative, especially for employment in vertical 
complex  FDI.  Over  a  longer  time  span  (six  years),  our  second  model  shows  a  positive 
correlation  between  domestic  and  foreign  employment,  in  particular  for  the  higher skilled 
workforce and for firms that undertake complex strategies of internationalization.   24 
Overall,  our  results  do  not  contrast  with  those  obtained  by  the  previous  empirical 
studies, namely by  Castellani et al. (2008) and Barba Navaretti et al. (2010) for Italy and 
Becker and Muendler (2008) for German firms. More specifically, our findings are in line with 
those of the first paper, which shows a positive impact of internationalization on high skilled 
employment. However, they are less positive than those obtained by the second paper, where a 
significant  increase  in  productivity,  output  and  employment  of  switching  firms  is  found 
immediately after the investment. 
It is worth recalling that, having investigated only FDI, our analysis does not take into 
account the effects of off shoring   i.e. international outsourcing   which may affect domestic 
production as well as FDI. Moreover, our study mainly focuses on medium  and especially 
large sized firms (the first model is based on a sample of firms with at least 50 employees; the 
second, on firms with at least with 20 employees). Therefore, it is possible that our conclusions 
do not fully apply to smaller enterprises investing abroad. Finally, we have observed a limited 
time period, up to six years, while internationalization may display effects over a longer time 
span. These issues represent interesting topics for the future research.   25 
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Fig. 1. Matching # 1 –Switching vs. other domestic firms 
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Fig. 2. Matching 2 –Switching vs. near-investing domestic firms 
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Table 1 
Means, standard deviations and standard errors in 2004 
(Standard deviation in round brackets; standard errors of the means in square brackets) 
 
  Multinationals (MN)  Domestic firms (DF) 







abroad  Other DF 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 




















































































































































































































Number of firms  270  89  26  280  1,118 
 Notes: (1) All MNEs are firms that produce goods or services abroad; (2) Switching firms are firms that switch from domestic to MNE and that are in 
the survey from 2 years before up to 1 year after the investment abroad; (3) Switching in the years 2003 04; (4) “Near investing abroad” are firms that 
have thought of investing abroad but that have not yet done so; (5) “Other DF” are firms that did have neither invested abroad nor considered the 
possibility of doing so. All nominal variables are in thousands of euros, except wages, which are in euros. Skill intensity is the ratio of non worker 
employees  to  total  employment  (white  collar/total  employment).  Profits  range  from  1  (strongly  positive)  to  5  (strongly  negative).  Research  and 
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Table 2 
Distribution of switching firms 
 




  Sector  %  Region of firm’s 
localization  % 
           
1989  1.2  Food, beverages and tobacco  3.5  Piedmont and Aosta Valley  15.3 
1990  1.2  Textiles and clothing  10.6  Lombardy  22.4 
1991  1.2  Leather products  7.1  Liguria  3.5 
1992  4.7  Wood and wood products  1.2  Trentino Alto Adige  1.2 
1993  1.2  Paper, printing and publishing  4.7  Veneto  7.1 
1994  7.1  Chemical products  4.7  Friuli Venezia Giulia  12.9 
1995  9.4  Rubber and plastic products  4.7  Emilia Romagna  10.6 
1996  2.4  Non metallic mineral products  7.1  Tuscany  4.7 
1997  1.2  Basic metal industries  4.7  Umbria  2.4 
1998  7.1  Machinery and equipment  20.0  Marche  5.9 
1999  10.6  Electrical machinery, accounting and 
computing  machinery 
16.5  Lazio  1.2 
2000  9.4  Transport equipment  5.9  Abruzzi  2.4 
2001  8.2  Other manufacturing industries  9.4  Campania  2.4 
2002  8.2      Puglia  5.9 
2003  7.1      Basilicata  1.2 
2004  20.0      Sardinia  1.2 
Total  100.0  Total  100.0  Total  100.0 
           
Notes: The table reports the distribution of matching #1 sample of switching. It would change only marginally if we used 
the sample of switching firms of matching #2. 
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Table 3 
Baseline results: Difference-in-Differences estimates 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Matching #1   Switching vs. domestic firms  Matching #2   Switching vs. near investing firms 
  (t*+1)  (t*+2)  (t*+1)  (t*+2) 
                 
































































Region, year and pair  
dummies 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  340  340  300  300  328  328  272  272 
Notes: The pre program period taken as reference for the DID estimates is one year before the first investment abroad (t* 1). Columns 1 4  give the results for matching # 1 (switching vs. domestic firms); 
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Table 4 
Difference-in-Differences estimates by type of FDI 
 
  Model without fixed effects  Model with fixed effects 
  Vertical or 
complex  Horizontal  Vertical or 
complex  Horizontal  Vertical or 
complex  Horizontal  Vertical or 
complex  Horizontal 
  (t*+1)  (t*+2)  (t*+1)  (t*+2) 
         
  Matching #1   Switching vs. domestic firms 

































































  Matching #2   Switching vs. near investing firms 
































































Region, year and pair  
dummies 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
Notes: The pre program period taken as reference for the DID estimates is one year before the first investment abroad (t* 1). Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firms in brackets. * p value<0.10, ** p 
value <0.05, *** p value <0.01. Vertical or complex firms are firms that experienced a fall in the value added sales ratio of more than 5% after the investment abroad. Observations at t*+1 (t*+2) are 340 (300) in 
the first matching and 328 (272) in the second, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Alternative empirical strategy 
Dependent variable:  log Domestic Employment (2000 2006) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
  Total employment  
 
White collars  
 
Blue collars   Robustness:  
Model  without outliers 
  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  OLS  IV  Total 
employ. 
White 
collars   Blue collars  
                               





























































  log Domestic Sales


















Sector fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.34  0.41  0.51  0.49  0.25  0.32  0.53  0.52  0.20  0.41  0.42  0.38  0.49  0.57  0.27 
First stage F test        35.18        35.18        35.18       
Obs.  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  96  97  97 
Notes:  y is the difference in the variable y between 2006 and 2000. IV columns report the results of 2SLS estimates taking log foreign employment2000 as instrument for  log foreign employment. Since some firms had 
zero foreign employment in 2000 a unit constant has been added to the variables to calculate the logarithm. Robust standard errors in brackets. *, **,***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Last three columns report 
the results of the models estimated by OLS excluding the 1
st and 99
th percentile of the distribution of the domestic employment growth. 
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Table 6 
Alternative empirical strategy: Results by type of investment  
Dependent variable:  log Domestic Employment (2000 2006) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Total employment   White collars   Blue collars  
       






























  log Domestic Sales






Sector fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Regional fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.51  0.56  0.39 
Obs.  101  101  101 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. *, **,***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.  OLS estimates. We break down 
the firms by type of investment abroad according their answers: those that indicated labor costs (proximity to final markets) as 
important or very important are considered vertical (horizontal). Those that answered both reasons were important or very 
important are classified complex; other gathers firms that indicated other reasons (tax system, laws and regulations, etc. ). 
 





Expanding vs. non-expanding multinationals 
 
Mean differences in 2000 
(st. error) 
DID Results 
Dep var:  
log Domestic employment 
  Domestic 
employment 
Domestic 
sales  Exports  (1)  (2) 
           
First method: Expanding=1 if  











Second method: Expanding=1 if  











Sector and regional FE  _  _  _  No  Yes 
           
           
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firms in brackets. *, **,***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.  OLS estimates.  
With the first method expanding firms are multinationals that experienced a growth of foreign employment between 2000 and 
2006; the others are non expanding; with the second method, expanding firms are those that experienced a change greater than the 
median. In the first group there are 74 expanding and 24 non expanding firms; in the second group there are 51 expanding and 47 
non expanding firms. DID results report the estimates of the coefficient g, in the equation (6). The observations are 196. 





Matching # 1: Switching vs. domestic firms 
Means and standardized differences over the two years before the investment abroad  
(one year before for growth rates) 
  Means 
(standard deviation) 








         












































































































Skill intensity  








Number of firms  85  68 
_  _ 
Notes: Standardized difference of the variable y = 100*(1/N)[Σi(yi)  Σj(yj)]/[Var(yi)+Var(yj)/2]
1/2, where i denotes switching firms and j 
firms of the control group. 
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Table A2 
Matching # 2: Switching vs. Near-investing domestic firms 
Means and standardized differences over the two years before the investment abroad  
(one year before for growth rates) 
  Means 
(standard deviation) 
  Switching  
firms 
Controls of  
switching firms 
Mean difference 




         



























































































Skill intensity  








Number of firms  82  59  _  _ 
Notes: Standardized difference of the variable y = 100*(1/N)[Σi(yi)  Σj(yj)]/[Var(yi)+Var(yj)/2]
1/2, where i denotes switching firms 


















Robustness: Recent switching samples 
Means and standardized differences over the two years before the investment abroad  
(one year before for growth rates) 
  Matching # 1  Matching # 2 
  Mean difference 




 (st error) 
Standardized  
difference 
         
Employment   165.6** 
(78.7) 
 24.6  57.2 
(41.7) 
15.7 
Sales   29814* 
(17341) 
 21.2  8527 
(11155) 
8.7 
Exports  92 
(8985) 
0.1  12825* 
(6646) 
23.6 
Exports/sales  0.069*** 
(0.030) 
27.6  0.027 
(0.028) 
10.3 
Investment   166 
(790) 
 2.3  935 
(608) 
16.3 
Sales/employment   10.79 
(10.23) 
 8.0   12.89 
(18.29) 
 8.7 
Skill intensity   0.008 
(0.023) 
 4.1   0.024 
(0.025) 
 12.6 
Investment/empl.  0.79 
(1.89) 
5.3  0.11 
(2.28) 
0.7 
Start year   2.10 
(3.40) 
 9.3  3.21 
(3.93) 
11.5 
Profits  0.23 
(0.14) 




growth rate % 
 0.22 
(1.46) 




growth rate % 
4.46 
(2.74) 




growth rate % 
4.68 
(2.97) 
28.5  0.53 
(3.1) 
2.7 
Skill intensity  
growth rate % 
 0.078 
(0.057) 
 26.0   5.7 
(5.3) 
 20.5 
Notes: Recent switching firms are those that invested after 1998. The number of switching firms in matching #1 (matching #2) is 











   39 
Table A4 
Robustness: Control groups chosen among recent switching firms and baseline results excluding outliers  
DID estimation results  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Matching #1   Switching vs. domestic firms  Matching #2   Switching vs. near investing firms 
  (t*+1)  (t*+2)  (t*+1)  (t*+2) 
                 
  A. Only recent switching firms 


































































               
  B. Baseline sample without outliers 
































Region, year and pair  
dummies 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Notes: The pre program period corresponds to one year before the first investment abroad (t* 1). Columns 1 4  contain the results for matching # 1 (switching vs. domestic firms); columns 5 8 the results for 
matching # 2 (switching vs. “near investing” firms). Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firms in brackets. * p value<0.10, ** p value <0.05, *** p value <0.01. In panel A the number of observations in the 
first matching at t+1 is 216 (at t+2: 198); in the second matching at t+1 there are 228 observations (at t+2: 192) In panel B the number of observations in the first (second) matching is 292 (264). Panel B reports 
the estimates of the baseline model excluding the 1
st and 99
th percentile of the distribution of the time change rate of each outcome variable. 
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Table A5 
Results by geographical area: Difference-in-Differences estimates 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Matching #1   Switching vs. domestic firms  Matching #2   Switching vs. near investing firms 
  (t*+1)  (t*+2)  (t*+1)  (t*+2) 
  Coeff.  St. err.  Coeff.  St. err.  Coeff.  St. err.  Coeff.  St. err.  Coeff.  St. err.  Coeff.  St. err.  Coeff.  St. err.  Coeff.  St. err. 
log Employment   0.002  (0.031)  0.014  (0.038)  0.003  (0.038)  0.024  (0.042)   0.031  (0.027)   0.035  (0.032)   0.024  (0.041)   0.034  (0.044) 
North East  0.029  (0.033)   0.010  (0.041)  0.041  (0.045)   0.008  (0.053)  0.031  (0.026)  0.009  (0.035)  0.011  (0.043)   0.008  (0.038) 
Center South  0.038  (0.040)  0.040  (0.0489  0.093**  (0.042)  0.076  (0.048)  0.059  (0.0389  0.096*  (0.050)  0.123**  (0.049)  0.188***  (0.053) 
log Sales  0.084  (0.052)  0.061  (0.0629  0.076  (0.066)  0.048  (0.093)  0.046  (0.049)  0.032  (0.048)   0.074  (0.062)   0.120**  (0.052) 
North East   0.049  (0.059)   0.023  (0.065)   0.000  (0.076)  0.059  (0.095)   0.042  (0.049)   0.055  (0.061)   0.037  (0.079)  0.009  (0.064) 
Center South   0.108  (0.076)   0.051  (0.088)  0.080  (0.105)  0.114  (0.109)   0.102  (0.080)   0.039  (0.076)  0.109  (0.087)  0.229**  (0.112) 
log Skill intensity  0.014  (0.012)  0.016  (0.015)  0.018  (0.015)  0.016  (0.017)  0.008  (0.016)  0.013  (0.012)  0.012  (0.016)  0.018  (0.015) 
North East   0.013  (0.013)   0.016  (0.014)   0.021  (0.016)   0.017  (0.015)   0.010  (0.015)   0.019*  (0.011)   0.015  (0.016)   0.021  (0.016) 
Center South   0.014  (0.013)   0.015  (0.016)   0.050*  (0.026)   0.049  (0.031)   0.025  (0.0189   0.032*  (0.017)   0.057**  (0.026)   0.074**  (0.029) 
log  Sales/Empl.  0.082*  (0.047)  0.046  (0.044)  0.073  (0.062)  0.023  (0.074)  0.077*  (0.042)  0.067  (0.048)   0.049  (0.049)   0.085*  (0.051) 
North East   0.079  (0.019)   0.013  (0.061)   0.041  (0.062)  0.067  (0.107)   0.072  (0.048)   0.064  (0.055)   0.048  (0.071)  0.018  (0.055) 
Center South   0.146*  (0.077)   0.091  (0.064)   0.012  (0.092)  0.037  (0.100)   0.160*  (0.059)   0.135*  (0.074)   0.014  (0.078)  0.039  (0.092) 
Region, year and pair  
dummies 
No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  340  340  300  300  328  328  272  272 
Notes: The pre program period taken as reference for the DID estimates is one year before the first investment abroad (t* 1). Columns 1 4  give the results for matching # 1 (switching vs. domestic firms); 
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Table A6 
Alternative empirical strategy: Results by geographical area 




  (1)  (2)  (3)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
 
Total employment   White collar   Blue collars  
       








































































  log Domestic Sales
2     0.024 
(0.031) 
      0.042 
(0.030) 
      0.015 
(0.041) 
  
Sector fixed effects  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
R2  0.38  0.39  0.45  0.33  0.34  0.40  0.23  0.24  0.32 
Obs.  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101 
Notes:  y is the difference of the variable y between 2006 and 2000. Since some firms had zero foreign employment in 2000 a unit constant has been added to the 
variables to calculate the logarithm. Robust standard errors in brackets. *, **,***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. The model includes the constant and two 
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